October 3, 2024
SEOUL – As Israel proceeds with a ground offensive against Hezbollah, the situation in the Middle East is deteriorating day by day. The prospects for ending the war are dim, while the loss of lives, including innocent civilians, and property damage continues to mount. In the past, during such crises, the United States would intervene to manage the situation. However, such interventions seem absent this time. The elements that guaranteed global peace and stability have suddenly vanished. Has the international order led by the US since the end of the Cold War collapsed?
On this matter, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman explained a grand struggle between the “coalition of inclusion” and the “coalition of resistance” while expressing hopes for prospective action from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The column has offered a broad view that pierces the essence of the current Middle Eastern conflict, showcasing yet another moment of insight. However, his analysis needs one crucial element: the variable of domestic politics. While domestic politics plays a decisive role in every country’s foreign policy, it is often excluded from analyses even by top-level scholars. This is because nations, when deciding foreign policy, rarely admit the importance of domestic politics as reasons and instead usually invoke action-reaction logic between states based on national interests. Therefore, Friedman’s grand picture needs to be reconstructed considering the domestic political factors in major related countries like Israel, Iran and the United States.
In Israel, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s personal calculations stand out. The prime minister faces responsibility for the failure to prevent last year’s surprise attack by Hamas. Over 41,615 Palestinians, mostly civilians, have died in Gaza due to Israeli military actions, adding to his burden. Israel, once seen as a victim of the Holocaust, is now increasingly viewed as a perpetrator of war crimes.
Netanyahu also faces personal legal issues related to corruption charges. Given his personal circumstances, Netanyahu may feel that he must secure an image of overwhelming victory to push for an end to the war. Otherwise, a conclusion to the war could signal the beginning of him being found legally or politically accountable. Thus, it’s natural to suspect that Israel’s continuation of its war against Hamas and its provocative military actions against Iran and Hezbollah may be driven more by Netanyahu’s personal political interests than by the broader struggle between the teams of “inclusion” and “resistance.”
Iran’s domestic politics show a different picture. Though Iran launched a missile attack toward Israel on Tuesday, the attack might be interpreted as a skillfully compromised operation. The timing was a bit late as retaliation for the death of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, killed on Sept. 27, and very late for the death of Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader, assassinated on July 31. The strike was more like a show of force rather than angling for real damages because Iran fully knows that most of the missiles would be intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome. The halfway response by Iran implies that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is representing the reformists, has a voice in the decision-making process, and he is trying to avoid a full-scale war with Israel and improve relations with the US.
US domestic politics also contribute to the situation in the Middle East. Despite the shocking number of Palestinian civilian casualties in the Israel-Hamas war, the US, the world’s hegemon responsible for maintaining global order, has shown an inability to act. One reason for the US allowing Netanyahu’s provocative policies might be the influence of the pro-Israel lobby within the US. However, flaws in the national security guidelines of the Indo-Pacific strategy might also be a significant factor. While this strategy aligns with the general American public’s displeasure with China, it has led to a perception that issues in other areas are of secondary importance. As a result, misunderstandings about the US’ global role and strategy have spread, leading to neglect in dealing with other regions. This neglect has erupted in various crises, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s continued military operations.
Why did the US adopt the Indo-Pacific strategy, which harms its hegemony and reputation? In short, it was a product of domestic political focus. After winning the 2016 election, then-President Donald Trump garnered national popularity by pointing to contradictions in the US economy and society as stemming from cheap Chinese products and illegal immigration. As a result, China-bashing became a political trend that no US politician could resist. Even the Biden administration had to adopt a foreign policy focused on checking China to survive in the domestic political arena.
By reconstructing the Middle East situation through the lens of domestic politics in the US, Israel and Iran, one can derive a somewhat different picture from Friedman’s grand narrative. Friedman may present the clash between the two coalitions as inevitable, but the cohesion within both camps is weak. China is not participating in the resistance coalition, and Iran is taking a halfway approach. Israel may play a critical role in Friedman’s inclusion coalition, but Iran, Iraq or Hezbollah do not need to be painted as villains, nor is it necessary to argue that eliminating them would connect the Asia-Pacific and Europe. Israel is already linking to the two areas by sea.
While understanding the rivalry between Friedman’s coalitions of inclusion and resistance is important for comprehending and resolving the Middle East crisis, it is equally critical to account for the changes, if not distortions, caused by domestic politics. This perspective allows us to urge the US to adopt and implement a global-scale strategy focusing on universal values and norms rather than a China-centered regional response like the Indo-Pacific strategy. Additionally, it is essential to pressure Netanyahu to abandon his reckless war initiatives and instead champion strategies for peace and coexistence in Israel and the wider Middle East. Taking into account domestic politics proposes a more comprehensive way of addressing the problems of the Middle East rather than focusing solely on a big-picture approach.