November 15, 2024
JAKARTA – President Prabowo Subianto’s inaugural visit to China underscores a pivot toward great power diplomacy, a strategic approach that may mark a significant departure from Indonesia’s traditional stance more closely resembling what is now referred to and discussed as “middle power diplomacy.”
Over the weekend, Prabowo met with key Chinese leaders, including Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Qiang, and finally, President Xi Jinping. The visit yielded several notable agreements, such as a US$10 billion investment pledge between the countries and several memorandums of understanding related to water conservation, the blue economy and maritime resources, and mining.
The joint statement issued by the leaders, titled “Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and Building a China-Indonesia Community with a Shared Future”, reflects Prabowo’s strategic framing of China as an essential partner.
From the various statements expressed by Prabowo, we can take a glimpse of how he stressed a multipolar world order, guided by principles like strategic autonomy, mutual trust, fairness and win-win cooperation.
Such a worldview indeed reflects the argument of the erosion of moral leadership by the very pole that has led the current global order, the United States, from unilateral protectionist policies, lack of appetite for all things multilateral, all the way to the moral quandary in the conflict in the Middle East.
Yet one aspect of this trip has raised concerns both domestically and internationally. For the first time, Indonesia acknowledged the existence of “overlapping claims” with China in the joint statement.
One article in the joint statement, namely Part 9 on maritime cooperation, reads: “The two sides reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims and agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering Committee to explore and advance relevant cooperation based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, flexibility, pragmatism, and consensus-building, pursuant to their respective prevailing laws and regulations.”
For many observers, this language suggests a marked shift. Previously, Indonesia maintained a principled stance on sovereignty, firmly anchored in international law, especially concerning its exclusive economic zone in the North Natuna Sea, established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The new phrasing implies a pragmatic acceptance of China’s status as a great power, making concessions to avoid direct confrontation, even over claims not supported by UNCLOS.
This is a glimpse of the essence of great power politics in Prabowo’s world view. Prabowo’s approach here underscores the pressures “smaller nations” face in balancing national interests with the influence of superpowers. The decision to pursue “joint development” in disputed areas signals a prioritization of diplomatic negotiation (via appeasement in the form of economic cooperation and joint development) over assertive defense of sovereign rights under international law.
I cannot imagine if a lesser power were to make such claims whether they would also be rewarded with joint ventures as with the Indonesian response. Yet here, China’s regional influence seemingly overrides this principle, underscoring a need to “appease” rather than confront.
For some, this shift is troubling. Indonesia’s foundational ideals, set by leaders like Sukarno, stressed independence and resilience, even to the point of rejecting aid if it infringed upon national sovereignty. By contrast, this latest approach suggests a more transactional view, where sovereign rights may be negotiated in favor of stability and economic interests, especially where great powers are concerned.
In this context, Prabowo’s foreign policy lens appears to acknowledge that great powers, China, in this case, require a level of diplomatic pragmatism that goes beyond international law. This approach, while arguably effective in the short term, could redefine Indonesia’s stance within ASEAN, with significant implications for regional unity, trust and ASEAN-China relations.
Only time will tell whether this pivot will benefit Indonesia’s national interest or erode the very principles that have long guided its foreign policy.
Indonesia’s evolving diplomatic stance with China, particularly on the South China Sea, must not overlook the imperative of China becoming a responsible regional neighbor. While Indonesia is willing to engage pragmatically, fostering lasting peace and stability requires China’s commitment to reducing tensions and aligning its actions with the principles of international law.
At this pivotal moment, China’s choices will profoundly influence ASEAN unity, regional economic vitality and the peace dividend that has allowed Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, to flourish.
Indonesia, however, must not step away from reminding China that a critical step forward is for China to adopt a benevolent great power role, one that is sensitive to the needs and concerns of its neighbors. For regional security to endure, China must not only reassure Southeast Asia of its peaceful intentions but also tangibly demonstrate goodwill through adherence to internationally recognized frameworks, particularly UNCLOS.
China’s constructive engagement through UNCLOS will reinforce ASEAN’s trust in its rise as a power that benefits, rather than disrupts, the regional order.
Indonesia should also stress the importance of upholding non-use of force and emphasize peaceful dispute resolution, urging China and all other parties in the South China Sea to articulate their positions through recognized international legal instruments. These frameworks provide the most reliable pathways for all stakeholders to settle disagreements without destabilizing the region.
China’s commitment to dialogue and restraint, particularly regarding Indonesia’s exclusive economic rights in the North Natuna Sea, will serve as a pivotal measure of its willingness to respect sovereign rights.
In return, Indonesia can still push its agenda to advance shared prosperity with China. But it must do so within a foundation of mutual respect and adherence to international norms and laws. The pursuit of joint economic ventures must not only align with regional aspirations for sustainable development, equitable partnerships and transparent cooperation, but also established international rules of play, an important tool for our fellow Southeast Asian neighbors.
While both nations stand to gain significantly from initiatives that prioritize environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation and industrial integration, it could do so in areas where Indonesia and China can work synergistically without compromising Indonesia’s sovereign rights.
As a close partner, Indonesia must remind China of its responsibility to reverse the regional trend of a trust deficit not just in Southeast Asia, but beyond, extending to East and South Asia. We have to learn that in global politics, friends remind one another, rather than giving blank checks of support.
With ASEAN’s role in global supply chains and advanced industries rapidly expanding, stability across Asia will be essential for ongoing development. As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, China’s willingness to accommodate the voices of smaller nations and build trust with its neighbors can redefine its rise as an asset, rather than a source of tension, for the region.
Ultimately, Indonesia’s vision for a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia requires China’s partnership as a responsible global leader. If China pursues this path, it will affirm its commitment to a shared future, one where all countries can pursue their development goals without fear of coercion.