February 7, 2025
DHAKA – Standing beside Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in front of the press in the White House, US President Donald Trump said on Tuesday, “We will take over Gaza. We will own it.” He went on to say that Gaza could become “the Riviera of the Middle East,” where the “world’s people” would live. His statement aligns with that of his son-in-law Jared Kushner, who told an audience at Harvard University last year that Israel should remove civilians while it “cleans up” the Gaza Strip, and that Gaza had very valuable “waterfront property.”
Trump’s announcement sent shockwaves through the world, including staunch Israeli allies such as Germany. Human rights organisations immediately denounced the proposal as ethnic cleansing of the residents of Gaza, the Palestinians, to neighbouring countries—a plan that was rejected by Jordan and Egypt earlier. Many Democrats, who backed Joe Biden’s 15 months of financing the mass murder of approximately 61,000 Palestinians in Gaza, found Trump’s plan “insane,” and extremely immoral. But, of course, it’s morally bankrupt and that’s besides the point. To understand Donald Trump’s intentions, the man who wrote the book Trump: The Art of the Deal, humanitarian values should be put aside. He views geopolitical relationships and foreign policy as real estate business deals, and realising that can take us closer to understanding whether he actually meant what he said and whether he can, or will, do it.
It’s easy to dismiss Trump’s remarks as unsurprising White colonisation. It is true that the plan shows a sharp departure from long-standing US policy of symbolic “two-state solution.” But it must be noted that we are here today because of decades of double standards of that very US policy in the first place, which unconditionally backed Israeli occupation in Palestinian territories and still talked about “two states” and “peace.” Sure, Biden had not suggested a plan so aggressive, but his administration had gone around trying to find an “international coalition” that would temporarily govern Gaza after the war. The fact is, US foreign policy has never intentionally recognised Nakba as a root cause of Palestinian resentment towards Israel, and no government has truly cared about Palestinians’ rights to self-determination. US national and geopolitical interests in the Middle East simply lie with strong-arming Israel. One could argue that Trump has replaced “Israel” with “United States” in terms of who will own and govern Palestinian land and Palestinian people.
International law, so to speak, has not really been a force to stop any atrocities in Gaza so far. Israel has openly committed crimes against humanity, and Netanyahu stood in the press conference with the US president despite an arrest warrant against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The US government’s invasion of Afghanistan, for example—on the premise of self-defence—did kill innocent civilians, despite claims that it was only targeting terrorists and enemy combatants. The US has ratified both The Hague and Geneva conventions that render unjustified killing of innocent civilians or unnecessary destruction of property as a violation of international law (however, they don’t constitute war crimes). Though the country ratified both conventions, it repeatedly violated them in Afghanistan. The US government denied many instances of civilian suffering until The New York Times published declassified records. Despite the documentation, none of the US military officials involved in strikes were held accountable. Only the victims paid the price for the US military’s “mistake.” We have seen Netanyahu use the phrase “tragic mistake” to refer to the deadly fire in refugee tents in Rafah last year, after images of charcoaled bodies and a beheaded child went viral.
As history is laden with unaccountability, it should be clear that laws will not stop Trump’s plan. So then, what can? Geopolitical relationships with the Arab states, and especially, Saudi Arabia, the most powerful US ally in the region.
In 2020, Trump managed to persuade UAE and Bahrain to sign his Abraham Accords. UAE’s reservation to signing the deal was Palestinian statehood and the condition was suspension of Israeli settlers’ plans to annex the West Bank. Trump hit the middle ground between the Israeli far-right and UAE to score the deal. Trump’s transactionalism embedded in his foreign policy that predates his outlandish statements presents a few questions: is the plan a calculated move to tame both Hamas and Israeli far-right? Or is it a negotiating tactic with the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia? Both are plausible.
For Hamas, Trump’s plan applies maximum pressure to give up the control of Gaza and simply maintain a presence there. The flip side of Trump’s pressure could be Hamas pulling out of the ceasefire agreement, which jeopardises the Israeli hostages returning, and the second phase of the ceasefire which includes a permanent end to the war and withdrawal of Israeli troops. The latter holds little meaning now as Trump suggests Palestinians should leave their homeland anyways. Hamas, which has been destabilised, might settle for maintaining some sort of presence of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as it would not be able to endure against US troops. On the other hand, far-right extremist Israelis—specifically those who were unhappy with Netanyahu and threatened to collapse his coalition for the ceasefire deal—positively reacted to Trump’s plan. An expulsion of 2.5 million Palestinians from the Gaza Strip has been a fantasy of the Israeli far-right, and Netanyahu has faced criticism for not having a “day after Gaza” plan. When Trump made the announcement, Netanyahu seemed incredibly delighted that Trump’s idea could reset his own difficult choices in Israel.
Worldwide uproar followed Trump’s statement, and Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry was the first to react to the announcement. They affirmed that the nation’s position on the establishment of a Palestinian state is “non-negotiable,” firm and unwavering with “no compromise,” which could presumably refer to the UAE normalisation deal. The statement added that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman “clearly and unequivocally reaffirmed this stance.”
For the past 15 months of Palestinian slaughter in Gaza, many of the Arab states have been on the sideline, with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia clamping down on pro-Palestinian protests in their own nations. All these nations have authoritarian governments who view grassroots activism as a threat to their regimes. “Arab states today do not like Palestinian nationalism because Palestinian nationalism is a source of popular mobilisation on the Arab street,” according to Nader Hashemi, director of the Prince Alwaleed Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. But in order to keep pro-Palestinian sentiments under control, Arab states have catered to public opinion with token gestures to support Palestine against Israel and succumbing to Trump’s plan would fuel public anger.
On the geopolitical front, relations with the US have been a source of security aid and financial assistance for some Arab states, and have prevented them from confronting Israel. For Mohammed bin Salman, eliminating Hamas and Hezbollah, who do not exist in Saudi Arabia, has been in his best interest against archrival Iran to maintain his nation’s dominance in the Middle East, and to ensure no politicisation of Islam can topple him in his country. Normalising relationships with Israel, too, is in his interest as it’s good for business—an ideology he shares with Trump. Mohammed bin Salman wants deals with the US for security and weapons, and Trump has already talked about asking Saudi Arabia to invest $1 trillion in the US economy and lower oil prices. Here, Trump’s Gaza plan puts a spanner in the works. Mohammed bin Salman would be careful so as to not anger his citizens by supporting Trump’s plan to expel Palestinians from Gaza. Making compromises could risk his position domestically, while losing deals with the US would not serve him geopolitically.
Egypt, on the other hand, needs US money to exist, and also serves as a lynchpin containing a potential powder keg of radical sentiment that, if detonated, would puncture European and US interests. Jordan, as well, is not only a close ally of the US, but dependent on US aid. Trump has already threatened economic blockades for Jordan, and King Abdullah is scheduled to visit the White House next week. But Egypt and Jordan can avert an economic blow if the wealthy Gulf nations unite against Trump’s Gaza plan. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has indicated that Jordan can change its position and accept Palestinian refugees from Gaza.
Whether Trump can coerce Arab States to get what he wants remains to be seen. The US president made the statement with the prime minister of Israel beside him, and to analyse it with a reactionary perspective such as the “madman” theory, as David Remnick of the New Yorker has done, only circulates blame games at those who voted for Trump, believing his campaign promise that the US would end all foreign wars, especially in Gaza. Trump has intentions in saying what he said, and determining what they are is difficult; he is the harbinger of potent unpredictability.
The Trump administration has made it clear that the “Riviera of the Middle East” would not be made with US funds, supposedly expecting Arab states to foot the bill. Trump’s proposal to play around with the lives of Palestinians could very well be a far-reaching offer on the table in exchange for normalisation, or Gaza’s reconstruction funded by wealthy Gulf nations. If we think of it as a deal, it also means that he could soften his position, and settle for less. He could very well not move forward if Arab states offer concessions acceptable to his geo-economic agendas. Donald Trump does not always follow through. But whether he does usually depends on short-term gains that portray him as the winner and the strongman who is “reviving America” as the sole superpower—in other words, making America great again.