March 3, 2025
JAKARTA/SINGAPORE – The reverberations of United States President Donald Trump’s Jan. 20 executive order on reevaluating and realigning US foreign aid are being felt worldwide, especially in countries like Indonesia that have been on the receiving end of US foreign assistance for decades.
One field that has been consistently supported through US foreign development assistance and which has received far less attention in the context of the funding pause is counterterrorism (CT) and preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE).
The impact of the cessation of US assistance on this sector is difficult to measure. But there may well be what futurists like to call a “long tail”: Less obvious possibilities that might cumulatively negatively impact Indonesia’s security outcomes.
In the past decade, the two major US-funded foreign assistance programs supporting CT and PCVE in Indonesia have been the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the Harmoni project, funded by USAID.
The ICITAP focuses on capacity building in areas ranging from transnational crime, human trafficking and deterring corruption, to working with Indonesian law enforcement agencies. The ICITAP had a role in capacity building for CT, for example in training law enforcement agencies, including the National Police’s counterterrorism unit, Densus 88.
The ICITAP has now been forced to suspend all activities in Indonesia.
Meanwhile, the Harmoni project, which is completely funded by USAID to the tune of almost US$30 million in 2018-2024, aimed to strengthen community resilience and enhance the capacity of key institutions to counter violent extremism, in collaboration with the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), government institutions at both national and sub-national levels, civil society organizations and local communities.
The Harmoni project was not affected by the 90-day pause since it concluded in October 2024 after six years of implementation. But during the six years it ran, it significantly contributed to advancing Indonesia’s National Action Plan (RAN PE) for PCVE 2021–2025, promoting resilience against violent extremism (VE) using principles of inclusion and social cohesion.
Key areas of focus included enhancing PCVE capacity through the development and application of various tools, and training and technical assistance. The various collaborative forums covered areas including raising awareness of VE risks, developing systems to bolster tolerance and counter the appeal of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), enabling the disengagement and reintegration of former VEO members and supporters, fostering social cohesion through inclusive education and providing capacity-building support to partners.
Throughout implementation, the Harmoni project collaborated with 49 national and local partners, 109 government institutions at national and sub-national levels, 208 universities and 264 secondary schools. Over 12,000 individuals directly participated.
This initiative was seen as one of the most successful collaborations between the US and Indonesian governments due to its impact on fostering resilient communities. The Harmoni project provided the BNPT with field-tested mechanisms and platforms to accelerate the implementation of RAN PE beyond 2025.
All this now faces a very uncertain future, with talk in some circles that the RAN PE Secretariat has even been disbanded (although there has been no official word). Also on hold, it appears, is the next phase of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (the Bali Work Plan). USAID played a central role in supporting the first phase and appeared to be supporting until recently an NGO-led effort to conduct research for the next phase of the Bali Work Plan.
The pause in US foreign assistance comes at a critical time as the BNPT announced a 69.1 percent budget cut for 2025 under President Prabowo Subianto’s administration, just days after Trump’s executive order. CVE circles in Indonesia have BNPT programs being postponed or canceled, and some personnel contracts being terminated.
More broadly, the substantial reduction in BNPT funding threatens CT and PCVE efforts, particularly in prevention and national resilience initiatives. Activities that will likely be impacted include the advancement and acceleration of RAN PE at the sub-national level, a key area where US assistance has played a crucial role in the past decade.
Additionally, disengagement and reintegration efforts for former terrorists and their families may also suffer. The absence or lack of interventions in these areas could increase the likelihood of VEOs regrouping and former terrorists reengaging with their previous networks.
The US funding pause may (especially if the pause becomes permanent) reinforce resentment toward the US, potentially undermining its strategic interests in Indonesia. US involvement in conflicts in the Middle East has been consistently exploited by extremist organizations and terrorist groups to fuel grievance narratives, which are used to incite ideological opposition to US interests worldwide, including in Indonesia.
In theory, there remains hope that this temporary pause will not be extended beyond 90 days and that US foreign assistance for CT and PCVE will resume. As US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on Feb. 11, “the US government understands the threats of global jihad and its desire to export that against US allies.” Whether the US understated the long-term dividends reaped by fostering tolerant, inclusive and resilient societies is perhaps a different matter.
The same questions could be asked internally. Should the pause become permanent, Indonesia’s CT and PCVE efforts will likely refocus on law enforcement and operational CT activities, led by the National Police, Densus 88 and the intelligence services, with the BNPT likely playing a diminished role. Efforts to identify, address and tackle the drivers of VE will not be a priority. The role of civil society organizations in PCVE will be severely curtailed, especially given the absence of fresh donors on the horizon who might be willing to plug the gaps.
A false optic is in danger of being created and perpetuated: to uninformed observers, no terror attack in Indonesia means no terrorism or VE problems; meaning that the operational approach to CT works on its own. It is unlikely to be coincidental that the police and military have not had their budgets cut.
There are of course various initiatives and programs independent of USAID’s funding streams that have made very positive contributions. These include the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ2) and programs run by the UNODC terrorism prevention branch.
But these will not be enough. Decreased funding and attention to drivers of VE will only serve over the medium and longer term to strengthen the enabling environment for VE groups to continue spreading their sectarian beliefs and polarizing narratives, normalizing intolerance among communities and thence in turn providing VE groups with opportunities to re-group and recruit.
Unless a holistic needs assessment, which includes “upstream” elements, is undertaken to identify unmet needs and gaps that need to be urgently plugged, Indonesia is on a trajectory that will create a ticking time bomb.
Umelto Labetubun is a conflict and security analyst and former USAID Harmoni Project senior technical advisor and chief of party.
Shashi Jayakumar is executive director of SJK Geostrategic Advisory Pte Ltd, a Singapore-based security and political risk firm.