October 17, 2025
DHAKA – As the nation waits for the final draft of the much-discussed July National Charter 2025 to be signed by the representatives of various political parties at a grand ceremony on Friday, it has become clear that what many had hoped for—a genuine national consensus on the path to democratic renewal—has fallen short of expectations. Uncertainty surrounding its implementation has left several parties hesitant to sign, despite an eleventh-hour intervention by Chief Adviser Professor Muhammad Yunus.
As of writing this column, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) remains the only major party to confirm its readiness to sign the charter, although it has added a caveat that its support has limits, and that it opposes any attempt to hold a referendum before the general election. In contrast, Jamaat-e-Islami has insisted that a referendum should precede the election, while the National Citizen Party (NCP) has said that they will not endorse it until the charter’s legal foundation is ensured.
The National Consensus Commission, which produced this landmark document after nearly eight months of extensive consultations, deserves recognition for bringing together diverse and often opposing political forces. It is particularly commendable that the commission has managed to engage parties traditionally seen as adversaries—Islamist groups and secular left-wing parties alike—in respectful and patient dialogue under its guidance.
Yet these encouraging efforts now appear to be at risk. The unity once observed among democratic forces, and the shared aspiration to rebuild a truly representative political order, have largely faltered. Many parties have shown themselves to be unable to bridge their differences over the nation’s future direction. Since the circulation of the final draft, some have questioned whether the exercise produced any meaningful consensus. Hasnat Quaiyum, president of the left-leaning Bangladesh Rastro Songskar Andolon, described the draft as “weaker” than the accord reached among the three alliances during the 1990s uprising against the late military ruler General HM Ershad. Several other parties have already announced that they will not endorse the charter.
According to the final version of the July Charter, when the consensus commission began its rounds of dialogue, representatives from 33 parties participated. However, only 30 are reflected in the final document. Of the 84 reform pledges included, only about one-third were unanimously agreed upon. Even among these, one or two parties abstained from expressing views on certain points. Nearly two-thirds of the remaining proposals were incorporated either with notes of dissent or without full consent.
A closer look at the charter shows that the broadest agreements were reached on issues that few politicians could publicly oppose, especially on the eve of a general election. At least six of these reforms address anti-corruption measures: preventing conflicts of interest and money laundering, expanding the Anti-Corruption Commission’s jurisdiction to the private sector, denying shelter to corrupt individuals within political parties, and ensuring transparency in election financing.
However, deeper divisions surfaced over contentious political questions. Disagreements persist over the powers of the proposed second chamber in parliament, eligibility criteria for its members, provisions for amending or suspending the constitution, appointments to key constitutional and regulatory bodies, the president’s impeachment process, nominating a deputy speaker from the opposition, and parliamentary ratification of international treaties. Several major parties have appended notes of dissent to these and other proposals.
Interestingly, although the charter’s introduction notes that the spreadsheet the commission shared with parties after the first phase of consultations did not include proposals for police reform, the final 84-point agenda now features a clause calling for the establishment of an independent Police Commission, complete with a detailed formation process. This proposed body would oversee internal disciplinary matters and public complaints. While 30 parties supported this single policing reform, the fate of other recommendations from the Police Reform Commission remains uncertain.
In an effort to curb the concentration of power in the Prime Minister’s Office, the consensus commission proposed granting the president independent authority to appoint the heads and members of six regulatory bodies. Yet, it seems questionable that the Bangladesh Press Council was included among these, given the Media Reform Commission (MRC)’s findings that the press council has long failed in its mandate due to partisanship and limited scope.
Originally established to safeguard press freedom and regulate newspapers, the press council has become obsolete amid the evolution of technology and the rise of digital and broadcast media. The MRC recommended replacing it with a permanent media commission to ensure comprehensive oversight. By retaining the outdated press council, the July Charter not only disregards the MRC’s recommendations but also risks obstructing essential reforms in the media sector.
Overall, the outcome suggests that the consensus commission may have overreached. Its decision to bypass specialised reform commissions while unilaterally advancing measures misaligned with broader democratic priorities has made the charter less convincing. Propositions on women’s representation in parliament have been included in the charter without listening to their voices. How can we build an inclusive democracy without formulating any roadmap for overhauling our local government system? A more measured, consultative, and inclusive approach might have yielded a more enduring and meaningful national consensus.
Kamal Ahmed is consulting editor at The Daily Star. He led the Media Reform Commission under the interim government. His X handle is @ahmedka1.
Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.