September 17, 2025
BANGKOK – Recent survey results from the National Institute of Development Administration (Nida Poll) highlight striking shifts in political support over the first half of 2025, reflecting the turbulence in Thai politics that intensified in September.
The survey indicates that support for Paetongtarn Shinawatra, a former prime minister and leader of the Pheu Thai Party, has declined significantly. Analysts attribute the decline in part to her missteps in handling the Thai–Cambodian border dispute.
In contrast, the Bhumjaithai Party has experienced an unexpected surge in popularity, despite lingering scandals involving the Khao Kradong land case and allegations of collusion in the Senate election.
The second-quarter poll, conducted at the end of June, asked who respondents would back as prime minister if an election were held today.
Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut, leader of the People’s Party, topped the list with 31%. Some 19.88% said no one was suitable, while former prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha followed at 12.72%. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul was backed by 9.64%, narrowly ahead of Paetongtarn at 9.2%.
These results contrast sharply with the first quarter, when Paetongtarn led with 30.9% support, followed by Natthaphong at 25.8%, and 23.7% of respondents undecided. At that time, Anutin was in sixth place with only 2.85%.
Party preferences have also shifted dramatically. In the second quarter, the People’s Party ranked first with 46.08%, followed by the United Thai Nation Party (13.24%), Pheu Thai (11.52%), and Bhumjaithai (9.76%).
In the first quarter, the People’s Party also led with 37.1%, but Pheu Thai followed closely at 28.05%, with United Thai Nation at 13.75%, the Democrats at 3.65%, and Bhumjaithai at 3.35%.
Anutin has since formally taken office as Thailand’s 32nd prime minister, supported by the People’s Party despite his minority coalition holding only 146 seats in parliament. He is currently forming a cabinet blending outsiders with coalition politicians.
Assoc Prof Suvicha Pouaree, director of Nida Poll, observed that Bhumjaithai’s assumption of executive power, under a pledge to dissolve the House of Representatives within four months and pursue constitutional reform as agreed in its memorandum of Agreement with the People’s Party, has redefined the political landscape.
“If Anutin avoids major missteps in the next four to five months leading up to the election, he could well secure a second term as prime minister,” Suvicha said.
Risks of Bhumjaithai breaking with the People’s Party
The political alliance between Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party, two groups with vastly different DNA, is being tested in the aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s ruling that any new charter must pass three separate referendums. The court also barred the establishment of a constitution-drafting body directly elected by the public, further straining relations between the blue and orange camps.
“Bringing them together is like mixing incompatible blood groups. At some point, it will cause turmoil, and the constitution is the flashpoint,” remarked Suvicha.
Analysts warn that pressure from the People’s Party could prompt Bhumjaithai to abandon its pledge to pursue constitutional reform. Anutin, unable to consolidate support from defectors in Pheu Thai, could instead argue that negotiations with the orange camp had collapsed, a justification to dissolve the House and return the decision to the electorate.
Three triggers for dissolution
Suvicha observed that Prime Minister Anutin might exercise his power to dissolve the House if Bhumjaithai’s rising popularity continues, a surge that could stem from…
- Launching a new phase of the government’s “half–half” subsidy scheme.
- Securing a decisive advantage for Thailand in the border conflict with Cambodia.
- Moving quickly to call an election before new political parties or emerging factions have time to organise.
Such a strategy could allow Anutin to dissolve the House without waiting for the four months pledged under the memorandum with the People’s Party.
A risky game for the People’s Party
According to Suvicha, the People’s Party appears willing to play along despite knowing the risks:
“It’s like they’re being deceived, but they accept it. They want an election, a second chance, and believe they can win more seats. If Bhumjaithai keeps its word, it gets constitutional reform. If Anutin tears up the pact, they can still claim betrayal and head to the polls. They have nothing to lose.”
Shifting popularity
Nida Poll’s past surveys show Pheu Thai’s support collapsing, falling from 28% to 11% following leaked audio of former prime minister Paetongtarn in conversation with Hun Sen. Paetongtarn’s own approval rating dropped from 31% to just 9%.
Bhumjaithai, by contrast, rose from 3% to 9% after withdrawing from government during the audio scandal. Suvicha believes its popularity will rise further in the third-quarter poll, due at the end of September, helped by cabinet appointments of non-party figures in key ministries such as foreign affairs, commerce, energy, and finance.
“If Anutin decides to leave the ministries of interior, transport, and justice in the hands of non-Bhumjaithai figures, voters will see him as respecting the law and not interfering in cases linked to his party. That would boost his credibility even more,” Suvicha said.
Three kingdoms in Thai politics — and a possible fourth emerging
Looking ahead to the 2026 general election, Suvicha forecasts that Bhumjaithai could secure no fewer than 100 seats, while Pheu Thai’s tally may fall below 60. The People’s Party is expected to retain roughly 150 seats, remaining the largest party on the list system and sweeping all 33 constituencies in Bangkok, leaving Pheu Thai without a single seat in the capital.
Suvicha’s projection is seen as plausible, given Nida Poll’s accuracy in the 2023 election when it correctly predicted that Move Forward would dominate Bangkok with 32 seats while Pheu Thai would win only one.
“The contest will be a three-way fight, but we must watch whether a fourth force emerges, a hybrid bloc blending liberal and conservative elements. If no strong newcomer appears, it will remain a three-kingdom battle,” Suvicha said.
He suggested that a potential “fourth camp” could be a new party drawing together younger activists, veteran politicians, local political dynasties, and technocrats. Such a grouping could siphon support not only from the People’s Party but also from Pheu Thai, United Thai Nation, Bhumjaithai, and others, turning the next election into a four-way race.
Paetongtarn under pressure
Asked whether Pheu Thai could lead a government again, Suvicha was sceptical. He argued that the party’s candidates will face an uphill battle, especially with opponents likely to weaponise leaked audio of former prime minister Paetongtarn speaking with Hun Sen. Combined with the Constitutional Court’s rulings, these issues could weaken Pheu Thai’s appeal among nationalist voters.
“In truth, Paetongtarn should step back from the leadership. Some argue you mustn’t change horses midstream, but this horse is already faltering. She could serve as an adviser instead, while the party finds a new, more marketable leader,” he said.
At present, Thaksin Shinawatra, serving a one-year prison sentence, remains instrumental in holding together Pheu Thai’s “Big House” (local political families)networks. Yet Suvicha believes the family name now hinders rather than helps. “The Shinawatras should move into the background. Paetongtarn cannot carry the party forward. Pheu Thai needs a leader outside the family to restore credibility,” he noted.
Still, the challenge is formidable. “Who would take the helm of a sinking ship riddled with leaks? Eventually, someone will step up, but not easily,” Suvicha added.
Three possible formulas for forming a government in 2026
Political analysts are already sketching scenarios for government formation after the 2026 general election, assuming Thai politics remains dominated by three major blocs and a “fourth camp” does not emerge.
1. Bhumjaithai–Pheu Thai coalition
In this model, Bhumjaithai would ally with smaller parties and bring in Pheu Thai to form a government. It would be a reversal of the current arrangement: previously, Pheu Thai was the dominant partner, but this time the blue camp would take the lead, while the red camp would bargain for control of key ministries.
2. People’s Party with Bhumjaithai
If the People’s Party manages to reach terms with Bhumjaithai, the two could form a government. Either the orange or the blue bloc could act as the leader in this equation.
3. People’s Party–Pheu Thai coalition
The least likely scenario would be a deal between the People’s Party and Pheu Thai. Even combined, their numbers would not reach a parliamentary majority. For instance, if the People’s Party holds 150 seats and Pheu Thai only 60, their 210 total would still fall short and require additional small parties to join.
Nida Poll director notes that the peak moment for the People’s Party has already passed, during the leadership of Pita Limjaroenrat. While the party is expected to hold Bangkok’s 33 constituencies, it could lose ground in large provincial districts to local “ big house” clans now aligning with Bhumjaithai, who have learned how to blunt the orange wave outside the capital.
Suvicha predicts that if an election were held today, Pheu Thai would suffer the heaviest losses, becoming vulnerable to attacks from all sides. Its future base would shrink to three groups:
- Loyalists to Thaksin and the party brand,
- Those reliant on list-MP positions, and
- Local dynasties (“big house”) with safe constituencies.
He argues that a Shinawatra family candidate for prime minister would no longer be viable in 2026, and the party would need to regroup before possibly mounting a comeback around 2029.
For recovery, Suvicha suggests three steps:
- Thaksin should step back from active politics,
- The party should rebuild its credibility as an opposition force, and
- A new leader, outside the Shinawatra family, should be appointed immediately.
As talk of a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Anutin grows, speculation is mounting that he could dissolve the House before the motion is tabled. If Pheu Thai were to file such a motion, Anutin might act pre-emptively, particularly if the People’s Party signals it would withhold support. In this scenario, the People’s Party would be squeezed by Pheu Thai, since the People’s Party also wants an election.
But if the House is not dissolved, it would be because Bhumjaithai has secured a sizeable bloc of ‘cobra’ MPs, largely defectors from Pheu Thai, estimated at no fewer than 50.
Observers suggest the next two months will reveal the extent of tensions between Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party over whether the latter will continue to prop up the government.
Suvicha noted that Bhumjaithai is positioning itself to become the leading force among conservative voters, filling the vacuum left by a weakened yellow bloc. The party, he said, appears ready for such a role.
In assessing the political acumen of Thailand’s leading figures, Suvicha singled out Newin Chidchob, the “master teacher” behind Bhumjaithai, as unmatched in strategy, positioning, and political manoeuvring. “Newin is the most precise and far-sighted in every respect,” he said.
By contrast, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit’s ideas, though modern in outlook, remain hampered by old political traps, while Thaksin Shinawatra’s wealth of experience is now seen as outdated in a rapidly changing society.
The conclusion, Suvicha argued, is that unless a fourth bloc emerges ahead of the 2026 election, the contest will remain between the three established camps. While some predict defeat for both the orange and red camps, Newin’s quiet influence remains decisive. Despite his public focus on football, Suvicha said, “Newin thinks of nothing but politics all day.”
It is this blend of old-school experience and adaptability to new political realities, he added, that enabled Newin to engineer Anutin’s rise to the premiership, and that may sustain his leadership ambitions for the next four years.