March 20, 2025
JAKARTA – While the world marked the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a few weeks ago, reaching a ceasefire and achieving peace remains to be seen.
Washington has decided to increasingly engage with Moscow, starting with excluding Ukraine from peace talks in mid-February, followed by voting along with Russia and North Korea against a European-backed United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s aggression, and culminating by stopping weapons delivery and intelligence support.
Such a chain of events highlights how a change of a great power’s foreign policy could affect the overall security environment. In fact, United States-Russia-Ukraine relations underline the growing unpredictability of the current geopolitical trends and the future of alliances and strategic partnerships.
The shift in US foreign policy will eventually impact regional stability, sooner rather than later.
The first and immediate implication has been apparent in Europe, where the European Union announced a plan to provide up to 150 billion-euro loans to support its members boost their armed forces and defense industries as a response to the US decision to freeze all military aid to Ukraine.
The EU’s move to ramp up its military force for deterrence, while also supporting Ukraine, underlines its strategic anxiety on the current geopolitical reality and how US-Europe alliance would look like.
Similar concerns also applied to US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Under President Donald Trump’s leadership, the Quad (Australia, India, Japan and the US) is likely continuing to be the front face of the US security and defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific, while questions could be directed to the role of AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the US) and whether Canberra could still count on Washington to support the former’s China strategy.
In parallel, Southeast Asia remains the least in US priorities. Although the Philippines believes the Trump administration will continue its support for Manila amid the tension in the South China Sea, it is not the case for Indonesia.
The ongoing geopolitical dynamic has at least two important lessons for Indonesia in terms of its strategic partnerships.
First, the changing US foreign policy calls for self-reflection or evaluation of Indonesia’s foreign policy. Jakarta must first determine who it considers part of the Western and Eastern blocs before maintaining, if not adapting, its nonalignment posture and “neutrality”.
For instance, among the objectives of Indonesia’s accession to BRICS is to expand its economic partnerships and cooperation. Moreover, the accession also emphasizes Jakarta’s pragmatic nonalignment stance and an attempt to strike a balance amid the growing tensions between great powers. But with the recent development, where is the middle ground for Jakarta to stand and uphold its neutrality?
Second, and arguably the most crucial, the shifting US foreign policy also highlights the vulnerability of defense partnerships, especially for countries that rely on bigger ones for a security umbrella amid the growing tensions. For example, a recent article in The Guardian mentions that Canberra knows the US it once knew is gone, despite putting the Quad as the keystone of US policy in the Indo-Pacific.
Noting this, it is fair to say that Australia is facing the same strategic anxiety as Europe when it comes to its defense and security partnerships and eventually, the future of AUKUS. Canberra’s concerns in turn become relevant to Indonesia and what Jakarta should be expecting from its partnerships.
In the current circumstances where alliances and conflicts are hard to predict, strategic partnerships arguably remain a crucial aspect of one’s survival, especially for countries that are yet to be self-reliant like Indonesia. For Jakarta, selecting such partners should not only be based on mutual economic interests, but also consider the political and defense aspects.
To note, Indonesia is currently maintaining several strategic partnerships, which include specific defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) that have become the foundation for Jakarta’s weapons procurement, most notably with Australia, China, France, Turkey and the US.
Throughout the years, Indonesia’s defense partnerships have exceeded military-to-military engagement. They have also become opportunities for Jakarta to support its defense modernization plan at the government-to-government (G2G) level, and eventually its defense industry at the business-to-business (B2B) level to protect its sovereign interests.
In this light, Jakarta’s defense cooperation, now and in the future, should also consider the sustainability aspect, where credibility is long-lasting and will not be subjected to various factors, such as financial implications and changes of leadership.
Among Indonesia’s aforementioned strategic cooperation, France has arguably demonstrated its stability as a reliable partner.
In his speech on March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron highlighted that the world was now entering a “new era”, where he emphasized Paris’s commitment and leadership to ensure that the security of Europe should not be determined by either Washington or Moscow.
The consistency of France’s commitment does not only apply to Ukraine and its European allies for security reasons, but also in various aspects, including the human rights of Palestinians in Gaza and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. A good example was recently provided with the Clemenceau 25 mission. This led to the deployment of the French Carrier Strike Group (CSG), which aimed to increase interoperability between partners in the region while also demonstrating France – and by extension, Europe – withstanding support.
For Indonesia in particular, France has also shown its credibility in supporting Jakarta’s defense modernization plan.
In fact, the Indonesia-France strategic partnership is not limited to commercial and business relations: The projects are cemented at the G2G level to further ensure sustainability and reliance for Jakarta, be it in the medium or long term. Such cases are evident in the procurement of Dassault Rafale’s fighter jets and Naval Group’s Scorpene Evolved submarines.
To further boost Indonesia’s defense of its sovereign interests and its naval posture, France has also offered the FDI/Belh@rra frigate, which can fully operate with Merah Putih-class frigates, to complement and enhance the Indonesian Navy’s capacity.
Indonesia is now facing an era where its nonalignment posture and partnership strategy are being tested.
The current reality on the ground, as witnessed with Ukraine, shows us that states can no longer rely on mutual economic benefits to survive. It is a reminder that, for Indonesia to live up to its status as regional and middle powers, Jakarta will have to navigate and ensure that its pursuit of economic interests will not undermine its security and sovereignty.
Choosing the right partner for Indonesia amid the ongoing geopolitical dilemma will depend on how policymakers can prioritize, if not balance, its needs and interests for long-term assurance.
The writer is research coordinator and manager at PT Semar Sentinel Indonesia. The views expressed are personal.