December 11, 2024
MANILA – One can only imagine the extent of damage brought by the swarm of Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea, especially now that China is continuing its act of war to assert control over most of the South China Sea.
Back in 2021, the US-based company Simularity already said that China’s disposal of raw sewage, such as human waste, was destroying corals and creating a “dead zone” where fish could no longer breed.
READ: Before China poop popped in WPS, reclamation already exacting toll on PH
Likewise, vessels from China are found to be harvesting giant clams and corals from the West Philippine Sea, leaving extensive damage to the “diverse and fragile ecosystems” of the South China Sea.
But while China denied these accusations, SeaLight, an initiative of researchers from Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation said that “no independent verification has been possible” because of China’s policy of suppressing information. There’s no press freedom in China.
READ: ‘Irreparable harm’: China intrusion’s impact on West Philippine Sea ecosystem
Solid presence
As pointed out by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), the presence of Chinese vessels in the South China Sea has grown stronger than ever, saying that even the China Coast Guard (CCG) maintained almost daily patrols in key features of maritime territory that has been ruled to be not theirs.
It said that together with the ubiquitous presence of its maritime militia, China’s constant coast guard patrols reveal its determination to assert control over the vast area within its nine, now 10-dash line, which has already been declared illegal.
AMTI said that last year, Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal and Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal, which are both within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines, had been patrolled by CCG vessels.
Some, like CCG 5201, had been present for almost over 100 days in 2023, AMTI said as it stressed that the numbers could still be higher as CCG vessels violate requirements to turn on their Automatic Identification System which makes them undetectable except to the naked eye.
RELATED STORY: West PH Sea: Chinese ships fire water cannon, harass PH vessels anew – PCG
This year, the Philippine Navy said that China’s presence in the West Philippine Sea hit a record high with 251 CCG vessels (28), People’s Liberation Army Navy warships (16), maritime militia vessels (204), and Chinese research vessels (3).
China’s militia
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pointed out that since completing the construction of its artificial islands in the Spratlys, “China has shifted its focus toward asserting control over peacetime activity across the South China Sea”.
“A key component of this shift has been the expansion of China’s maritime militia—a force of vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military,” it said.
Based on a CSIS study, militia vessels fall into two main categories—professional militia vessels and commercial fishing boats recruited into militia activity by subsidy programs and known as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV).
It stated that professional vessels are generally built to more rigorous specifications that include explicitly military features, although even SBFVs are steel-hulled and measure at least 35 meters, with many measuring 55 meters or more.
RELATED STORY: China strikes again: Militia ship sideswipes BFAR vessel
China’s modern use of fishing militias dates back to 1974, when they were employed in seizing the Paracel Islands from Vietnam, the CSIS said in its report “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia”.
Several developments in the 1980s, including the 1985 establishment of a militia force on Hainan and the establishment of China’s first bases in the Spratlys in 1988, laid the groundwork for a more active militia in the succeeding decades.
Chinese ownership
The CSIS said that “the ownership structures of militia and likely militia vessels are simple: an examination of registered owners indicates that 90 percent of vessels analyzed are either directly owned by, or one entity removed from, their ultimate beneficial owner.”
Militia ownership appears to be concentrated in the localities from which they operate: of the 28 companies identified as directly owning militia vessels, 22 are based in Guangdong and five are based in Hainan.
Most militia and likely militia vessels’ ownership networks were not found to be linked to the Chinese government, but for three suspected maritime militia vessels, CSIS study’s corporate network mapping ended not in a natural person but rather a Chinese government entity.
It said that this established a clear link between activity at sea and the government entities ultimately responsible for the vessels.
For example, the vessel Bin Hai 285—involved in the ramming of the Vietnamese surveillance vessel KN-951 in the South China Sea in 2014–is directly owned by China Oilfield Services Ltd., which is ultimately wholly owned by the Chinese state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of State Council.
As stressed by the CSIS, A wide array of central and local government programs have been implemented in recent years to finance the militia:
- Dual fuel subsidies for SBFVs operating in waters around the Spratly Islands
- Subsidies for the construction of fishing vessels (including SBFVs) targeting the Spratly waters
- Subsidies for construction of professional militia vessels
- Subsidies for the installation and renovation of equipment on board fishing vessels
- Construction loan interest subsidies
- Training programs aimed at recruiting military veterans to work in the militia