June 1, 2026
KUALA LUMPUR – No mortal is ever spared from worries or the bitter taste of unease—not even Anwar Ibrahim, comfortably seated at the zenith of power as Malaysia’s prime minister.
Late last Friday night, Anwar unexpectedly posted a video on social media, admitting with unusually candid and emotional disposition that he was far from perfect, and that there was much room for reflection and improvement.
He pledged to continue carrying out the mandate entrusted to him by the rakyat with the highest sense of responsibility.
On one front, the prime minister must navigate the potential economic aftershocks of the US-Israel joint military action against Iran.
On the other, there are increasingly loud calls for an early election from both within and beyond his administration. Added to this are Johor Umno’s decision to go solo in the coming state election, the departure of Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi and their subsequent takeover of BERSAMA, and the political uncertainties surrounding DAP’s July 12 special congress.
Together, these developments have created a political headache of industrial proportions!
BERSAMA is widely regarded as a vehicle capable of siphoning PH’s traditional Chinese and Indian support in urban and semi-urban constituencies. Should that happen, PKR and DAP may find their winning chances considerably watered down.
Amid such uncertainties, PKR’s relative weakness has inevitably cast a shadow over PH’s broader image, prompting renewed skepticism about Anwar’s ability to effectively lead the coalition into the next election battle.
PKR is neither perceived as fully consolidated nor wholly united under Anwar’s stewardship.
Whatever justifications the PM might have, the stark reality of PH’s failure to fully deliver on its election pledges and manifesto commitments has cost the coalition a substantial following.
For years, PH—PKR in particular—has expended tremendous effort in an unfruitful attempt to broaden its appeal among Malay voters.
The returns, unfortunately, have been modest at best. The coalition’s rapport with the Malay electorate has remained awkwardly at arm’s length.
In the meantime, many Chinese and Indian supporters have grown increasingly disillusioned with the pace and substance of reform, the enthusiasm once firing PH’s political momentum noticeably ebbing away.
As a consequence, PH finds itself stranded in a political no-man’s-land, unable to move decisively either way.
As the Malay proverb goes, Yang dikejar tak dapat, yang dikendong berciciran: letting go of what’s in hand in vain pursuit of what we don’t possess.
Frankly speaking, PH’s strategy of rallying Chinese and Indian support through emotional appeals such as “vote against us and the Green Wave will take power” will eventually prove ineffective.
A growing number of voters have openly declared they would rather stay home on polling day!
That being said, staying away from the polling booth is itself a costly and potentially detrimental political choice.
Anwar has recently responded to one of DAP’s longstanding appeals regarding UEC recognition.
While the outcome may not be favorable to everyone, it nevertheless provides DAP with something it can put forward to the delegates at its upcoming special congress.
The same cannot be said for two other key issues: the government’s refusal to release details concerning former MACC chief Azam Baki’s alleged shareholding controversy, and the controversial “corporate mafia” investigations. Meaningful progress remains elusive on both fronts.
Anwar may have his own calculations—or multiple layers of calculations—but for DAP, the inability to secure progress on these matters risks exposing the party to mounting pressure from within its own ranks.
Facing restive grassroots sentiment and relentless assaults from opponents, DAP has pinned its hopes on the July 12 congress as an opportunity to consolidate party consensus, clarify reform priorities, and manage supporters’ expectations.
Yet, should former prime minister Najib Razak secure release from prison before the DAP congress, the political landscape could see a dramatic detour.
For many in DAP, such a development would cross a political red line, galvanizing the party to reconsider its position within the Unity Government, or even to contest independently in the next election.
While it remains uncertain whether such a scenario will materialize, the risks of an unintended political collision must never be downplayed.
As for PN, even if the coalition now occupies a significant corner of Malaysia’s three-way political rivalry alongside PH and BN, it is nowhere near a model of internal harmony.
PAS President Hadi Awang’s increasingly assertive moves against Bersatu have left many observers confounded.
After all, already presiding over the opposition alliance, why should PAS continue to squeeze out Muhyiddin Yassin at the risk of jostling Bersatu out of the coalition completely?
Perhaps, as the saying goes, two tigers cannot live peacefully on the same mountain!
An increasingly powerful PAS clearly sees the next election as its best bet to capture Putrajaya and stake a claim to the prized PM-ship.
Sources close to Muhyiddin suggest PAS believes PN stands a realistic chance of forming the next government.
If that assessment is valid, uprooting potential resistance before the race starts is veritably prudent political housekeeping!
PAS is convinced that seat negotiations will never tilt entirely in its favor were Muhyiddin to remain influential within the coalition.
The Islamist party’s alleged support for Hamzah Zainudin reflects a straightforward objective: to secure more seats, be the coalition’s dominant force, and emerge as the country’s single most prominent political entity.
That said, Muhyiddin is not someone who would surrender without putting up a good fight.
Having founded Bersatu and played a central role in the formation of PN, it is unlikely the former prime minister will exit the coalition of his own accord.
We have yet to see whether the upcoming PN Supreme Council meeting will result in Bersatu’s removal.
Those aligned with Muhyiddin are also watching the calculations of Gerakan Rakyat as well as the Malaysian Indian People’s Party (MIPP).
Meanwhile, Hamzah has reportedly abandoned his plans to take over BERJASA, while PAS is said to be encouraging him to expedite the formation, or takeover, of a new party slated for mid-June—allegedly backed by more than ten MPs, 20 state assemblymen, and some 120,000 grassroots supporters.
Should those plans falter, PAS may eventually consider quitting PN in favor of a new alliance alongside Hamzah!
For now, as long as Muhyiddin remains securely anchored within PN, Hadi Awang’s ambitions face significant obstacles.
Muhyiddin has previously rejected proposals to admit new parties as full PN members, insisting that only electoral partners—not member parties—should be inducted.
The move effectively slammed shut what critics described as Hamzah’s preferred “side entrance” into the coalition.
Muhyiddin has also reportedly grown frustrated with Hadi Awang’s habit of overturning decisions reached through formal coalition mechanisms.
Resolutions adopted in PN’s meetings and subsequently presented to PAS have on multiple occasions been revised or turned down by Hadi despite his absence from earlier discussions.
This invariably sparks the question of whether cabinet decisions—should Ahmad Samsuri become the country’s next prime minister—would still require post-meeting approval from party elders to take effect.
The ongoing friction between Bersatu and PAS ultimately revolves around two names: Hamzah Zainudin and Hadi Awang.
Muhyiddin believed he had helped Hamzah’s rise within Bersatu, only to find himself confronted by a protégé appearing increasingly aligned with PAS.
His frustration deepened after the latter’s unauthorized involvement in last December’s “Bangkok Move” alongside Ahmad Zahid and Takiyuddin Hassan regarding surreptitious political realignments.
Consequently, Muhyiddin’s camp dismissed accusations of a private meeting with Anwar Ibrahim as outright slander, arguing instead that any outreach to Umno had come from Hamzah, not Muhyiddin himself!
To be honest, in politics, today’s betrayal often becomes tomorrow’s coalition agreement. Survival and power remain the ultimate currencies. The phrase “once bitten, twice shy” should be treated as a guideline rather than a law of nature.
After Parliament is dissolved, it shouldn’t come as a surprise if Bersatu opts to align with PH while PAS embraces BN under some newly branded framework of “national unity.”
Umno, like PAS, has identified PH’s vulnerabilities and increasingly views the next election as its best chance to reclaim power.
Johor BN fired the opening shot by announcing its intention to contest all 56 state seats independently of PH, a move that generated immediate unease within PH ranks.
State BN chairman Onn Hafiz Ghazi said the decision had the blessing of BN’s central leadership.
Many in Umno are convinced the so-called “Najib effect” has enormous electoral value.
Their conviction is straightforward: Malay voters remember economic stability and Chinese businesses remember commercial confidence—all could be cajoled into looking back nostalgically at Najib’s tenure, remarkably boosting BN’s electoral mandate!
Whether nostalgia translates into votes is a different story altogether.
Against this backdrop, Najib’s legal future has evolved into one of the most closely watched developments in Malaysia.
Will “Bossku” ever be allowed to serve his sentence under house arrest? Will he receive a full pardon?
Either way, DAP will find the eventuality unacceptable, as the red line has already been crossed. Whether this becomes the last straw that actualizes DAP’s go-solo enterprise remains a key question hovering over the party’s July 12 congress.
Beyond partisan politics, concerns about judicial independence deserve equal attention.
Judges and the legal fraternity are not only worried about transient political turmoil, but also the attrition of constitutional monarchy and the separation of powers as a result of prolonged political maneuvering, which could culminate in a structural imbalance.
Once faith in judicial independence starts to wither, the damage could extend far beyond courtrooms, ultimately shattering public trust in the national system.
As for MCA, its post-election recovery has been hampered by a failure to articulate compelling new ideas or reform agendas capable of reconnecting with the Chinese electorate.
In today’s fragmented political environment, surviving solely on public frustration with DAP will not take MCA any further.
Notably, the monarchy will assume an increasingly prominent role in the Malaysian political landscape.
The current Yang di-Pertuan Agong and state Rulers have moved well beyond the relatively restrained posture reminiscent of Tun Mahathir’s first administration.
While continuing to exercise constitutional authority, they have also become more vocal on matters impacting public welfare, steadily reinforcing an image of custodianship and stabilizing force.
Amidst political turbulence and an increasingly visible power vacuum, the renewed prominence of the monarchy’s role is by no means accidental, but rather a predictable consequence of an off-balance shift that has been brewing for years.
Malaysia’s powerplay now finds itself at a crucial crossroads.
If the rivalry among BN, PN, and PH continues to degenerate into deeper fragmentation and perpetual infighting, the country’s political environment will sink deeper into imbalance, precipitating PAS’s rise as the sole beneficiary of the chaos.
Once that happens, the country will invariably transition into a new phase of uncertainty and restructuring, where the monarchy’s stabilizing role becomes even more crucial and pronounced.