January 16, 2026
NEW DELHI – As the electoral campaigning in Bangladesh heats up amid renewed calls for a boycott of the forthcoming elections by ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and rising instances of mob violence in the neighbouring nation, India is closely watching the scenario as it unfolds in Dhaka.
Government policymakers and independent strategic thinkers in New Delhi broadly agree that the wide range of political, economic, and security issues confronting the two neighbours can only be addressed by an elected government with a clear mandate to pursue long-term policy choices.
The dilemma is whether an elected government with broad acceptance will emerge out of the chaos and how long it will last in the turbulent street politics of Dhaka. Bangladesh’s political transition since August 2024 has raised uncomfortable questions about legitimacy, stability, and the future direction of the country, questions that carry direct consequences for India’s neighbourhood strategy.
“India has always been willing to do business with any government in Dhaka,” said former Deputy National Security Adviser and Secretary in the MEA, Pankaj Saran, pointing out that Begum Zia was hosted by India “with the same level of protocol as given to a head of state” after Sheikh Hasina won the election in 2008.
“Similarly, in 2015, when Prime Minister Narendra visited Dhaka, he met her … we have always reached out to all,” said Saran, in a conversation with UNI.
The diplomat, who earlier served as India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh, characterised the change of regime as “sudden and violent, marked by an element of revenge and retribution”, even though it was not accompanied by “the assassinations that have historically punctuated regime change” in India’s neighbourhood.
He pointed out that the “ideological head of Jamaat, Asif Nazrul was one of those who were behind” the formation of Muhammad Yunus’s government and that Jamaat had positioned itself well in the new governance structure with appointments which ‘have been less than opaque.”
While sources said that the Jamaat has been in touch with India by sending representatives to meet Indian officials in New Delhi and through the Afghan Taliban, it is to be seen how they firm up their policies vis-à-vis the neighbourhood.
At the heart of the unease lies the nature of the current dispensation. Since August 2024, the leadership of Muhammad Yunus has been mired in controversy, with critics arguing that the regime derives its legitimacy not from constitutional processes but from the momentum of a revolutionary moment.
“There are many who believe that this does not represent a legitimate change of power,” Saran noted, a perception that has complicated both domestic politics and external engagement.
If democratic legitimacy is one axis of India’s concern, security is the other. Former NSA to Mauritius and retired IPS officer Shantanu Mukharji warns of the “re-emergence of Islamic militancy in Bangladesh, a trend that had been significantly contained during the tenure of former prime minister Sheikh Hasina.”
Also troubling, from a democratic standpoint, is the exclusion of the Awami League from the electoral process. The Awami League, Indian policymakers point out, is not a fringe party but one of the central pillars of Bangladesh’s political system.
Its absence has narrowed the contest to two former allies, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, distorting the representative character of the elections.
While the BNP has governed Bangladesh for long periods, often in dynastic form from Ziaur Rahman to Khaleda Zia and potentially Tarique Rahman, Jamaat enters the contest with a structural advantage, having secured key positions within the current administration.
At the same time, Bangladesh’s political landscape is undergoing a demographic shift. A new generation of voters, born in the 21st century, may no longer be shaped by the historic ‘Razakar (pro-Pakistan force) versus Mukti Joddha (Bangladesh’s freedom fighters)’ divide that once dominated electoral narratives, introducing new uncertainties into an already volatile process.
Drawing on the experience of the 1990s and early 2000s, Mukharji cautions that periods of political flux in Bangladesh have historically provided space for extremist networks to regroup and disturb the neighbourhood.
These concerns are compounded by the activities of Pakistan and its intelligence agency, the ISI, which Mukharji argues could seek to exploit Bangladesh’s political uncertainty.
Equally destabilising is the emergence of armed Rohingya camps along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, creating a volatile security environment with implications that extend well beyond Bangladesh’s borders.
Yet, as former High Commissioner to Pakistan and noted author TCA Raghavan said, India’s response “must avoid familiar pitfalls”. He cautioned against recurring mistakes that have often constrained New Delhi’s neighbourhood policy.
The first is allowing the “legitimate defence of minority rights and human rights to dominate bilateral relationships”.
While these issues matter, Raghavan argued, over-emphasising them, as India has sometimes done in its dealings with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, can narrow diplomatic space and provoke backlash.
The second mistake is the tendency to label political actors in neighbouring countries as “pro-India” or “anti-India.” Such labels, he noted, ignore the reality that all political forces operate primarily in pursuit of their own sectarian or national interests.
Taken together, these perspectives point to a sobering conclusion. India’s influence over Bangladesh’s political trajectory is inherently limited, particularly in moments of upheaval.
While New Delhi has a clear interest in democratic legitimacy, internal stability, and the containment of militancy, these objectives cannot be imposed from outside.
For the moment, the challenge is not merely to wait and watch, but to calibrate expectations and concentrate on national interests being protected and guard against security spillovers.