February 10, 2025
JAKARTA – Indonesia’s approach to the South China Sea dispute has undergone a noticeable shift, reflecting a growing disinterest in the issue. This change can be traced back to president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s tenure, during which he consistently maintained that Indonesia has no territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea.
While efforts to finalize the Code of Conduct (CoC) through ASEAN multilateralism continue, they appear to be more of a diplomatic formality rather than a serious endeavor to establish a common understanding between ASEAN countries and China.
Domestically, Jokowi’s policies on maritime issues have often been framed within a nationalist sentiment. His administration initially took an assertive stance on illegal fishing under the leadership of Susi Pudjiastuti, the former Marine Affairs and Fisheries minister. Her bold approach, including the controversial “seize and sink” policy against foreign vessels encroaching on Indonesian waters, signaled a strong maritime policy. Additionally, the decision to rename part of the South China Sea as the “North Natuna Sea” was seen as an attempt to reaffirm Indonesia’s sovereignty.
However, the true nature of Jokowi’s maritime approach was eventually revealed. The removal of Susi from her ministerial position marked a turning point, signaling Indonesia’s shift in priorities from maritime assertiveness to economic cooperation. This transition was underscored by public disagreements within Jokowi’s cabinet, notably between vice president Jusuf Kalla and Luhut B. Pandjaitan, then-coordinating maritime and investment affairs minister, who viewed Susi’s hardline policy as potentially damaging to Indonesia’s relations with neighboring countries, including China.
Economic considerations have played a decisive role in shaping this new direction. China remains Indonesia’s largest trading partner and one of its biggest sources of foreign direct investment, alongside Singapore and Hong Kong. In the first half of 2022 alone, Indonesia’s exports to China increased by 34.2 percent, further solidifying economic ties. This growing economic interdependence has likely contributed to Indonesia’s reluctance to adopt an aggressive maritime posture against China.
The shift in Indonesia’s South China Sea policy has become even more evident under President Prabowo Subianto. His administration has effectively left the dispute to the direct claimants rather than treating it as a regional issue.
A recent joint statement between Indonesia and China has drawn sharp criticism, particularly regarding a clause on joint development in areas of “overlapping claims” in the South China Sea. This agreement suggests a further erosion of Indonesia’s commitment to ASEAN-led multilateralism, allowing individual member states to devise their own strategies for managing the dispute.
In recent years, ASEAN’s unity regarding the South China Sea has also been tested. While Indonesia previously played a role in advocating for a collective ASEAN approach, its recent disengagement has left other member states without a strong regional advocate. Countries such as the Philippines, which have been more vocal in their opposition to China’s claims, find themselves increasingly isolated as ASEAN struggles to maintain a coherent stance.
The lack of a unified ASEAN response has provided China with greater leverage in negotiating bilateral agreements with individual member states, further weakening ASEAN’s position as a regional bloc.
Additionally, Indonesia’s naval activities in the South China Sea have been relatively restrained compared with previous years. While the Indonesian Navy continues to conduct patrols in the North Natuna Sea, these operations have not been as assertive as they were under Susi’s tenure.
Instead, the focus has shifted toward economic and infrastructural cooperation, particularly in investment-heavy projects backed by Chinese funding. This change in approach reflects a broader trend in Indonesian foreign policy, where economic priorities increasingly outweigh security concerns.
Another factor contributing to Indonesia’s disengagement is its broader geopolitical strategy. As Indonesia seeks to position itself as a global middle power, it has prioritized maintaining balanced relations with major global players.
Unlike countries that have openly aligned with either the United States or China, Indonesia has sought to navigate a more neutral path, engaging in partnerships with both sides. This balancing act has made it difficult for Indonesia to take a firm stand on the South China Sea without jeopardizing its broader diplomatic strategy.
The implications of Indonesia’s shifting stance are significant. It raises concerns about the effectiveness of ASEAN’s multilateral framework in addressing maritime disputes.
Without Indonesia’s active leadership, ASEAN’s ability to negotiate a meaningful Code of Conduct with China is further weakened.
Furthermore, it signals a broader trend of economic pragmatism over territorial sovereignty, where short-term economic gains are prioritized over long-term strategic interests. Lastly, it sets a precedent for other ASEAN nations that may follow suit, leading to a more fragmented regional approach to the South China Sea dispute.
In conclusion, Indonesia has effectively abandoned the South China Sea issue. Its multilateral engagement has diminished, leaving ASEAN members to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape on their own.
This shift reflects Indonesia’s pragmatic approach, prioritizing economic interests over regional maritime security concerns. As a result, the South China Sea dispute is increasingly being shaped by bilateral negotiations rather than collective regional action, further complicating efforts to establish a unified stance on the issue.
Unless Indonesia reassesses its approach, ASEAN’s role in the South China Sea will continue to diminish, leaving room for external powers to exert greater influence in the region.