September 10, 2025
SEOUL – North Korean leader Kim Jong-un again underscored his drive to strengthen the country’s “nuclear strategic forces” as he observed a test of a new solid-fuel engine designed for intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US with greater survivability and mobility.
Seoul-based observers noted the choreography of Kim’s recent spate of public appearances tied to missile and nuclear buildup — bracketed around his trip to Beijing for China’s 80th Victory Day celebrations, where he stood shoulder to shoulder with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin — as a calculated showcase of his nuclear ambitions.
The timing, they added, was meant to press Washington and Seoul by casting North Korea’s nuclear status as irreversible, with tacit acquiescence from Beijing, while translating Kim’s diplomatic gains at the Victory Day event into military confidence for audiences both at home and abroad.
State-run Korean Central News Agency on Tuesday reported Kim’s observation of a “ground jet test of high-thrust solid-fuel engine using the composite carbon fiber material” jointly conducted the previous day by North Korea’s Missile Administration and the Academy of Chemical Materials.
“Comrade Kim Jong-un assessed that the marvelous fruition called the development of a high-thrust carbon-fiber solid-fuel engine becomes the achievement bearing the most strategic character in the defense technology modernization project we have recently carried out,” KCNA said in its Korean-language dispatch.
“And (he assessed) that it foretells a significant change in expanding and strengthening the nuclear strategic forces of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” KCNA added, referring to North Korea by its official name.
Tuesday’s report conspicuously came after Kim inspected an unnamed institute of the General Academy of Chemical Materials under the Missile Administration on Sept. 1. KCNA previously reported that the institute has developed the “high-thrust solid-fuel engine with the composite carbon fiber material,” which will be used for the Hwasong-19 ICBM series and the next generation Hwasong-20 ICBM.
Kim also ratified three long-term plans for missile production capacity and a corresponding national defense spending plan during his visit to an unspecified major munitions factory on Aug. 31, where missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons — such as the KN-23 — were displayed.
Hong Min, a senior researcher at South Korea’s government-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, underscored the implications of the timing of successive state media reports highlighting Kim’s muscle-flexing.
Hong further explained that China generally views North Korea’s disclosure of ICBM and tactical nuclear weapons capabilities “with great sensitivity, as such moves provoke the US, justify its deployment of additional strategic assets against North Korea, and increase military pressure on China.”
“Such bold moves by North Korea before and after Victory Day can be interpreted as being carried out under the judgment that China’s understanding or tacit approval is possible, or as an attempt to display the irreversible status of its nuclear buildup by harnessing the Victory Day effect,” Hong said.
Hong also pointed out that the front page of Tuesday’s edition of the Rodong Sinmun, an organ of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, juxtaposed the new ICBM engine test on the left side with Xi Jinping’s congratulatory letter to Kim on the right on the occasion of the 77th anniversary of North Korea’s founding, which falls on Sept. 9.
“After viewing new ICBMs such as the DF-5C and DF-61 at China’s Victory Day event, North Korea also disclosed the new ICBM engine test, giving the impression that the two countries have a certain understanding in nuclear weapons advancement, with China seemingly supporting North Korea’s nuclear capability advancement and nuclear possession.”
The Unification Ministry in Seoul said North Korea’s state media report on Tuesday was mainly aimed at an external audience, noting the disparities in content between the state-run KCNA, which primarily caters to foreign readers, and the Rodong Sinmun, which is tailored for domestic audiences.
In the Rodong Sinmun, the report was relatively brief, while KCNA specified that it was the ninth test, the final one in the development process, with a maximum thrust of 1,972 kN, and included other details such as the entire entourage accompanying Kim.
The ministry further noted that Kim’s two previous visits — one to the munitions factory and another to the research institute developing a new solid-fuel engine for an ICBM, apparently the same engine referenced in Tuesday’s report — were also reported only by KCNA, not by the Rodong Sinmun.
“This suggests that the message was intended more for an external audience than a domestic one,” a Unification Ministry official said Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity.