February 18, 2025
ISLAMABAD – WHAT has been the record of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government as it completes one year in power? While the ruling coalition claims many achievements, this is not reflected in how the public rates its performance.
An Ipsos opinion survey in December found almost 80 per cent of people believed the country was going in the wrong direction. Sharif’s governance has in fact been underwhelming with several of the country’s challenges yet to be tackled and political stability still elusive.
A disputed general election cast a shadow over the Sharif government from the outset of its tenure and denuded it of legitimacy. The election produced a hung parliament and fragmented mandate. Imran Khan’s PTI won a plurality of seats to emerge as the single largest bloc in parliament. But it was PML-N and allies backed by the establishment that formed the government, supported by the PPP.
PML-N’s lack of a majority and consequent lack of self-confidence increased its dependence on the establishment, which it also needed to counter Khan and PTI. Indeed, the glue that held coalition members and the establishment together was their shared hostility to Khan.
This paved the way for the military to acquire the most extensive role yet in a civilian set-up. The post-2018 hybrid governing arrangement transformed into one in which the military became directly involved in many more spheres of governance including the economy.
This was unprecedented even by the standards of Pakistan’s history of military influence over civilian governments. Sharif seemed happy to cede more space to the military leadership. This contributed to a decisive shift in the civil-military balance to the latter’s advantage.
Countering PTI proved far from easy for the government. Frequent street protests by PTI and disruptions of parliamentary proceedings kept the government unsettled and preoccupied with confrontations with the opposition. May 9 and Nov 26 saw violent street clashes with the two sides adopting sharply conflicting narratives on what happened. Political battles were also fought on the floor of the House and in the courts.
If the government was unable to dent Khan’s popularity by instituting legal cases against him, PTI was unable to pressure the ruling coalition to free Khan, jailed since August 2023, and meet its other demands. Unable to ‘fix’ the Khan problem, the government increasingly resorted to repressive measures and crackdowns on the opposition. This pushed Pakistan in a more authoritarian direction.
Governance by the ruling coalition has been underwhelming and marked by growing authoritarianism.
Increasing autocratisation of the country under Sharif was reflected in a slew of government actions. The most consequential was the 26th Constitutional Amendment. This was rushed through parliament and adopted without debate. It struck a blow to judicial independence by making the judiciary subservient to the executive. The amendment gave the government the power to choose the chief justice from a panel of the Supreme Court’s three senior most judges.
A parliamentary committee reflecting the government’s majority was empowered to nominate the CJ. It selected Yahya Afridi, the third judge on the seniority list, as chief justice — superseding Justice Mansoor Ali Shah, regarded as too independent. The government also acquired the power to transfer high court judges. When it did that, judges from the Islamabad High Court objected, but in vain. The government’s manipulation of the higher judiciary sowed unprecedented division among judges and triggered protests by lawyers and the opposition.
The Sharif government treated parliament as a rubber stamp and also sought to stifle the freedom of expression. It went much further than its civilian predecessors in trying to control the electronic and social media. Aided by the establishment, it used informal means to ‘regulate’ the media, routinely issuing instructions to TV channels about its coverage.
It changed the cybercrime law to criminalise online speech by amending the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016. This sparked angry protests from journalists but the government refused to back off. The Peca changes aimed at tightening government control over the digital space which already involved a ban on X and other internet restrictions and censorship.
The government’s economic management has meant some progress in establishing short-term macroeconomic stability. It secured a $7 billion IMF loan package by meeting several conditionalities to impose fiscal discipline, undertake tax and austerity measures and limit subsidies. Its economic measures helped to stabilise the economy and control inflation but without improvements in the tax system and any structural changes in reining in expenditure.
Moreover, stabilisation has yet to involve building sufficient capacity to repay loans. This raises doubts about its sustainability given Pakistan’s large external financing needs in coming years, low foreign exchange reserves and heavy debt burden. Exports have fallen to 8pc of GDP from 16pc a decade ago. Constant requests for loan rollovers to lenders, especially China, indicate the persisting lack of repaying capacity — requiring yet more borrowing.
The government hasn’t been able to present an actionable home-grown economic plan that identifies past mistakes and makes a course correction to chart a sustainable path to growth. The much-touted Uraan programme doesn’t offer a strategy that spells out how goals — such as $100bn in exports in eight years — are to be achieved. Surprisingly, it lacks emphasis on reforms.
A transition from stabilisation to growth and investment also requires a stable political environment, which remains elusive. Despite SIFC efforts over the past year, investment has remained stagnant. The investment-to-GDP ratio at 13pc has actually fallen from previous years.
The security situation deteriorated markedly under Sharif. The surge in terrorist and militant violence across KP and Balochistan made the past year the deadliest in a decade in casualties suffered by law-enforcement personnel. The government kept convening meetings on the security challenge but was unable to show improvement on the ground.
Space does not permit an evaluation of Sharif’s foreign policy. It is sufficient to note that it has lacked any vision or strategic direction and been bereft of the clarity and coherence needed to meet challenges and respond to dramatic shifts in global geopolitics. Undertaking constant foreign tours, especially to Gulf countries, does little to obscure this.
Sharif’s foreign policy endeavours have mostly focused on seeking loans and debt rollovers from close allies, reducing Pakistan to a supplicant in its key bilateral relationships.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.