May 26, 2025
ISLAMABAD – WARS, even short ones, carry plenty of consequences. The India-Pakistan one from earlier this month was no different.
Its aftermath leaves behind a combination of heightened security for some, and heightened insecurity for many others. Incumbents in power in both countries benefited from the strengthening of their domestic positions. When the adrenaline of nationalism runs high, difficult questions about security lapses, geographic vulnerabilities, and long-term policies are set aside. The mood becomes celebratory, lauding, feting, and consecrating those in the driving seat.
Laudatory outcomes in Pakistan include a fresh promotion for the army chief, another extension for the air chief, a significant bump in public approval for the military as per at least one survey, and unquestioning acceptance of the need for greater defence spending to stave off the Indian threat in the future.
Civilian partners in the incumbent regime also gained an advantage. They can take some comfort in the renewed vigour and tenure security of their ‘same-page’ arrangement. The PML-N might actually be able to see off an entire five-year term without changing their prime minister. And the prospects of a deal between the establishment and the PTI, one that would be beneficial for the latter and harmful for the incumbent party, appears to be off the table for now.
Mirroring the same in India, the BJP-led coalition government appears to have staved off some growing public apathy and incumbent fatigue. It has won space for its security agenda (as demonstrated in the recent anti-Naxal operations), and set itself up well for the upcoming state elections in Bihar. Under the ambit of a national threat, it has also managed to sideline a few irritants in the domestic media space, and shut off indirect people-to-people cultural contact through YouTube and music-streaming platforms.
Going forward, the Indian population’s view of their neighbours will filter through whatever the state deems acceptable. The task of ‘otherising’ the enemy and creating cultural gulfs amidst shared heritage — a long-term agenda of right-wingers in both countries — will be considerably easier.
This bonanza of security for some, opens up a world of insecurity for most others. One obvious consequence is the vulnerability felt by common citizens in different parts of the region. People living in Pakistani Punjab’s big cities will now go about their daily lives knowing that they remain fair game for missiles and drones launched from India; knowledge made worse by the fact that the trigger for such an attack may be something relatively miniscule and unrelated to their actions. The same is true for those residing in parts of India along its western borders.
For those already existing under insecurity, such as the people of Kashmir, the skirmish intensifies distress and caution. Pakistan and India may be bitter rivals, but they appear to have forged an implicit agreement around the cheapened worth of Kashmiri lives. These lives in and around the LoC are deemed to be the most dispensable under the ambit of artillery fire. Their level of dispensability is now up by several notches.
Upon its conclusion, open warfare is also leaving behind ‘sub-conventional warfare’ as a strategy for both states. Civilian populations are fair game. Terrorism will continue to rear its ugly head. No one will be spared, not even — as we’ve recently learnt — children on their way to school.
Vectors of heightened insecurity don’t just operate across national borders, they run through internal fault lines as well. States under siege turn their attention to ‘local collaborators’ and domestic nuisances. For Muslims of India-held Kashmir, the terrorist attack and its subsequent aftermath makes a bad situation even worse. The region is already one of the most militarised in the world. Security force deployment is likely to go up further. The practice of regulating movement and communication will become more common. A state of exception, where fundamental rights and civil liberties are distant concepts, will remain the norm.
In Pakistan, all manner of opposition will experience new forms of insecurity. Freshly legitimised, recently rewarded, and thriving in the afterglow of a successful military response to Indian aggression, the establishment is far better placed to move forward with its domestic agenda. Opposition parties, mainly the PTI, find the already small space available to them shrinking even further.
Other initiatives being pushed by the centre, such as the ones related to land allocation and control in Gilgit-Baltistan, have been quickly approved by the local assembly; opposition to the Land Reform Act was summarily dismissed. Several activists were rounded up and incarcerated. In the context of such swift domestic action, it might be unsurprising if the contentious issue of canal irrigation in Cholistan rears its head once again. Will opposition be as vigorous this time around, especially considering how the domestic political situation has changed?
No one asked for war, least of all the average Pakistani. The state responded justifiably well to a blatant act of aggression from across the border. In doing so, it carried out an essential task that defines the modern state — securing territorial integrity through the use of violence.
But that is not the only task of the state. Making citizens feel secure and drawing legitimacy from their security and prosperity are also essential. While one particular form of insecurity — the one posed by a belligerent neighbour — has been addressed, other forms have deepened, either inadvertently or on purpose. Perhaps it makes sense to turn some of our attention to these other forms as well.
The writer teaches politics and sociology at Lums.