July 3, 2025
BANGKOK – Just one day after the royal endorsement of the “Paetongtarn 1/2” Cabinet on June 30 and ahead of the swearing-in ceremony scheduled for July 3, the Thai government appeared to be on stable footing, poised to move forward.
However, the situation took a dramatic turn on July 1 when the Constitutional Court unanimously voted 9-0 to accept a petition submitted by Mongkol Surasajja, President of the Senate, representing 36 senators, seeking the removal of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The petition centres on a leaked audio clip of her conversation with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen, which may involve Thai-Cambodian border issues. The court cited potential violations of Sections 170 (paragraph one, item 4) and 160 (items 4 and 5) of the Constitution.
In a 7–2 decision, the court ordered Paetongtarn to suspend her duties as Prime Minister until a final ruling is issued—creating a sudden “leadership vacuum” just as the new Cabinet was set to tackle urgent national issues.
According to Section 54 of the 2018 Organic Act on Constitutional Court Procedures, the next step will see the court formally notify the petitioner and grant the respondent 15 days from receipt to submit a written defence.
First, the case of former PM Srettha Thavisin, who faced a petition questioning his ethical qualifications after appointing Pichit Chuenban as Minister attached to the PM’s Office. Though the court did not suspend Srettha, it accepted the petition on May 23, 2024, and moved swiftly—scheduling a single hearing on July 24 and a final ruling on August 14. The court voted 5–4 to remove him from office for lacking integrity and violating ethical standards.
Second, the case of former PM Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, who was suspended by the court on August 24, 2022, over a petition to determine the constitutional limit of his tenure under Section 158. That process took more than a month, as the court gathered written evidence and expert opinions, before ruling on 30 September 2022 that his term had not yet expired.
Pheu Thai defence: “No factual basis – inadmissible evidence”
From the perspective of the Pheu Thai Party’s legal defence, Chusak Sirinil, Minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office and head of the government’s legal team, had previously commented on the case.
He argued that no actual damage had occurred and that the contents of the audio clip in question did not clearly indicate a serious ethical violation or a breach of integrity under the criteria for political office holders. He maintained that the conversation did not contain any facts suggesting a loss of sovereignty, territory, or a conflict of interest. In his view, it was merely a discussion aimed at resolving border issues.
Chusak also raised concerns over the admissibility of the evidence, suggesting the audio clip may have been obtained illegally, as it was recorded without consent. This, he noted, could be in violation of the Computer Crime Act, and must be carefully examined to determine whether the court can accept or trust such evidence.
“If the court adheres to general legal principles, unlawfully obtained evidence should not be admissible in the proceedings,” he said.
Constitutional Court and NACC cases deepen leadership vacuum
Regardless of whether the Constitutional Court proceedings in this case are concluded swiftly or drawn out over time, the process will inevitably impact the government.
Paetongtarn now finds herself in the midst of what is being described as a “legal war”, much like her coalition government, which is now facing a leadership vacuum after the Prime Minister was ordered to suspend her duties—even though she still holds the post of Minister of Culture.
It should also be noted that there is a parallel petition from senators regarding “ethical misconduct” submitted to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). On 23 June, the NACC unanimously agreed to begin a preliminary investigation into this matter.
If the NACC finds no grounds for wrongdoing, the case will be dropped. However, if the NACC rules that there is a case to answer, it must forward the matter to the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Holders of Political Office to pursue action on ethical grounds.
This raises the importance of monitoring how long the Constitutional Court takes to reach a conclusion, as its ruling may be influenced by or intertwined with the NACC’s findings in the coming weeks.
Another legal battle following closely behind involves the NACC’s acceptance of a probe into whether Cabinet members, MPs, and senators violated the Constitution by approving the 2025 budget bill that includes funding for the government’s digital wallet scheme—a cash handout programme. This may contravene Section 144 of the Constitution, which prohibits those with a direct or indirect interest from participating in budget allocations.
In the worst-case scenario, if the NACC refers the case to the Constitutional Court and the court rules there was a violation under Section 167(4), the Cabinet may be barred from continuing in a caretaker role. Should that happen, it would plunge the country into immediate political limbo.
Clearly, at a time when the government is navigating uncertain terrain, political forces both inside and outside Parliament are seizing the moment to intensify their attacks in parallel.
Opposition pushes for House dissolution
After Parliament reconvenes on 3 July, Bhumjaithai Party will be first to move in its new role in the opposition bloc, having been pushed out of the government coalition. The party plans to table a no-confidence motion under Section 151 of the Constitution, citing national security concerns over the leaked audio clip of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s conversation with Hun Sen.
All eyes are now on whether the opposition can meet the threshold for initiating the motion, which requires one-fifth of sitting MPs—99 out of 495 members. Bhumjaithai currently holds only 69 seats, leaving it 30 short. It remains to be seen whether the party can secure enough support.
Meanwhile, the People’s Party sees the growing political turbulence as a sign that the Pheu Thai-led government may not last much longer. The party is seizing the opportunity to call for House dissolution and fresh elections—a move clearly in its favour.
The efforts by Bhumjaithai and Palang Pracharath to present a united opposition front could be a strategic manoeuvre to destabilise Pheu Thai just as Paetongtarn finds herself politically weakened. Their ultimate goal may be to ride the momentum of conservative forces outside Parliament, who are mobilising to demand Paetongtarn’s resignation or the dissolution of Parliament. A major rally is reportedly being planned for August.
Internationally, Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen appears to be ramping up pressure on the Thai government through what some describe as a “circle Thailand” strategy, stirring foreign sentiment against the legitimacy of Thailand’s leadership.
At this critical moment, the Pheu Thai government is under siege from multiple directions. The question now being asked with growing urgency is: in such unstable conditions, how much longer can Paetongtarn hold on?