The international system remains uni-multipolar, with the US at its core

The writer says: "Whether the uni-multipolar system tilts toward stability or confrontation will depend on how the US chooses to wield the immense power it still possesses."

Phar_Kim_Beng

Phar_Kim_Beng

The Jakarta Post

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Philippine and US soldiers salute as their national anthems are played during the opening ceremony of the annual Balikatan (shoulder to shoulder) joint military exercise at Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City, suburban Manila, on April 20, 2026. PHOTO: AFP

April 30, 2026

KUALA LUMPUR – The contemporary international system is often described as multipolar, reflecting the rise of China, the persistence of Russia and the growing assertiveness of medium sized powers. Yet such a description remains incomplete.

The world today is better understood as uni-multipolar: a system in which multiple centers of power exist, but one state, the United States, continues to dominate in terms of aggregate hard power. This formulation was not coined recently.

As early as 1993, the late Samuel P. Huntington, writing in Foreign Affairs, described the post-Cold War order as neither fully unipolar nor genuinely multipolar.

Instead, he identified it as a hybrid structure—uni-multipolar—where the US stood at the apex, but other major powers retained sufficient capability to influence regional balances.

Crucially, Huntington did not see this system as permanent. He understood it as temporal, contingent upon how the US chose to exercise its power. This insight is more relevant today than ever.

The US still retains unparalleled military capabilities.

Its global network of bases, alliances and expeditionary forces allows it to project power across continents with a speed and scale unmatched by any rival.

Its technological edge in areas such as surveillance, precision strikes and naval aviation continues to anchor its position at the top of the hierarchy.

Yet, as Huntington cautioned, the durability of this primacy depends less on capability than on conduct.

If the US behaves as a responsible power—one that exercises restraint, respects international norms and works through multilateral institutions—there are fewer incentives for other great powers to counterbalance it. In such a scenario, American leadership is tolerated, even welcomed, as a stabilizing force.

However, when the US adopts a reflexively militarized approach to global challenges—treating political, economic and diplomatic problems primarily through the lens of force—it risks eroding that acceptance.

This is the paradox of power. The more a dominant state relies on its military superiority to resolve issues, the more it invites resistance.

We are beginning to see this dynamic unfold. China’s rapid military modernization, Russia’s willingness to assert itself despite constraints and even the strategic recalibrations of traditional Western allies all point to a subtle but significant shift.

These actors are not merely reacting to material capabilities; they are responding to perceptions of how US power is being used. In this sense, balancing behavior is not inevitable, it is conditional.

Even within the Western alliance system, there are growing signs of discomfort when US policies appear overly unilateral or excessively militarized.

European states, for instance, increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy, not necessarily to oppose the US outright, but to counterbalance against the overdependence on a single power whose decisions may not always align with their interests.

Thus, the uni-multipolar system contains within it the seeds of its own transformation. The US, as the leading power, faces a fundamental choice.

It can sustain its position through a combination of strength and legitimacy, or it can rely predominantly on coercive instruments, thereby accelerating the very balancing dynamics it seeks to prevent.

There is also a deeper psychological dimension. To remain perpetually “on top” in a system where others are rising is an inherently lonely position.

The pursuit of unchallenged primacy can lead to strategic overreach, as the dominant power attempts to manage multiple theaters simultaneously while preventing the emergence of peer competitors.

Yet history suggests that such efforts are difficult to sustain indefinitely.

For regions such as Southeast Asia, this evolving dynamic reinforces the need for strategic sobriety. The region must navigate between competing powers without becoming entangled in their rivalries.

It must support norms that discourage militarization while recognizing that power realities cannot be ignored.

Ultimately, Huntington’s insight endures: the uni-multipolar system is not a fixed endpoint, but a phase—one that can either evolve into a more balanced and cooperative order or devolve into intensified competition and fragmentation.

Whether it tilts toward stability or confrontation will depend, to a significant extent, on how the US chooses to wield the immense power it still possesses.

For now all eyes are on the standoff in the blockade of The Strait of Hormuz between Iran and the US.

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