July 4, 2025
ISLAMABAD – The recent Iran-Israel direct military confrontation, and the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have sparked a geopolitical rebalancing across the wider Middle East. From Islamabad to Ankara, capitals across West Asia are urgently rethinking their strategies after the dramatic events of the past two weeks. Every actor with a stake in the region’s decades-long conflicts is now re-evaluating its position and seeking to understand where the major powers and other regional countries stand. Most crucially, the lessons that Tehran and Tel Aviv draw from this showdown will shape the emerging power dynamics across the region.
From Tehran to Tel Aviv — major takeaways
The 12-day war catapulted the simmering covert and proxy battles between the two sides into a direct war of attrition, the first for Iran since the Iran-Iraq War. For three decades, the Islamic Republic had relied on various militias in its protracted conflict with both Israel and the US. But as the war came home — with direct Israeli attacks and targeted US strikes on Iran’s prized nuclear facilities — the absence of a capable air force able to defend Iran’s skies became evident.
Although this may be an outcome of decades-long sanctions that have constrained Iran’s military procurements, the fact that the Iranian air force did not engage Israeli fighter jets when they entered its airspace has significant implications for the post-ceasefire rebuilding of its nuclear enterprise. Tehran will have to factor in Israel’s air superiority as it seeks ways to regain control of its skies.
Politically, Iran now faces its most existential question: should it seek a nuclear shield to ensure the security of the regime?
For nearly three decades, Iranian leaders have toyed with the notion of ‘nuclear latency’ or ‘nuclear threshold’ — that is, putting in place the building blocks of a nuclear capability that would enable them to sprint toward a nuclear weapon whenever a political decision is made. US and Israeli strikes have sought to neutralise one of the bomb pathways — uranium enrichment — in which Iran has invested over the past decade. The extent of the setbacks to Iranian nuclear facilities is not yet known.
Conversely, for Tel Aviv, the shifting political goalposts posed a challenge to its military strategy. Moving from merely disrupting Iran’s nuclear pursuits to seeking regime change limited the Israeli military’s ability to achieve its objectives solely through air power and by sowing discord within Iran’s decision-making structures. This shift also unnerved the Gulf neighbours of both Iran and Israel, as it revived memories of the 2003 Iraq war.
Yet, as the aggressor, Israel could not unilaterally strike the Fordow nuclear enrichment plant and had to rely on Washington to carry out the attack. This dependency grants the Trump administration political leverage over Israel as it seeks to enforce the Israel-Iran ceasefire, and especially, ensure Israel’s compliance.
Beyond this, Israel now views itself as the predominant military hegemon across the Middle East; a perception that could spark unease in other regional capitals wary of a risk-taking Israel, potentially triggering inter-state wars rather than just conflicts with militant groups.
Nervous Gulf
During the 12-day war, the most anxious leaders were in the Gulf region. For decades, the Gulf states had relied on the American security umbrella and their political influence in Washington to advance their political and security interests. During this time, both the Gulf states and Israel perceived a common threat from Iran’s regional ambitions.
Yet, in recent years, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had found ways to stabilise ties with Iran and pursue coexistence. That delicate balance has now been disturbed by the war, as the Gulf faces a new threat: Iran’s warnings of attacks on US bases across the region.
Post-ceasefire, the Gulf now faces several daunting scenarios:
- Preparing for a nuclear-armed Iran
- Coexisting with a weakened regime in Tehran that may seek to reassert its position, sparking further instability
- Bracing for the next war, as Israel’s risk-acceptance threshold has increased
- Pursuing geopolitical balancing by deepening engagements with Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing
During the war, Israel’s ambition of regime change unnerved Gulf leaders. As much as the Gulf states oppose a nuclear-armed Iran, it is the possibility of a civil conflict that puts regional leaders on edge. How can a stable political transition be achieved in a country with nearly half a million trained soldiers, where any power vacuum could result in a bloody civil war? Would Israeli or American forces actually commit to fighting on the ground to support opposition groups? And if civil unrest erupts, how can Iran’s stockpile of nuclear materials and technology be effectively secured?
Gulf countries, and Iran’s other neighbours, dread the prospect of prolonged internal unrest in Iran, as it could embolden centrifugal forces across the region. Moreover, political instability in Iran would likely lead to an exodus of people toward the Gulf and Europe, while triggering a new wave of militant violence.
The great powers: Limits of influence?
For the great powers — the US, Russia and China — the evolving geopolitics of the Middle East is crucial for their global strategies. For the US, which is both an actor in the current conflict and an external power influencing regional dynamics, the key challenge is to avoid new entanglement in the Middle East.
Washington’s primary strategic focus remains the Indo-Pacific, and a prolonged conflict in the Middle East would only serve as an unwelcome distraction. For now, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining a weakened, non-nuclear Iran, which would allow its Gulf partners to deepen their ties with Israel. Both Washington broadly, and the Trump administration specifically, have backed a Middle East shaped by the Abraham Accords — promoting normalisation between Israel and key Arab states, while largely sidestepping the divisive issue of Palestine.
This vision of peace is intended to enable Washington’s Gulf security partners, working in coordination with Israel, to take greater responsibility for regional security. In turn, this would allow the United States to reallocate military resources to the Asia-Pacific, where it is increasingly focused on countering China. However, Washington believes that a nuclear-capable Iran would inevitably undermine this regional order.
Conversely, for Russia and China — whose absence from the current war was striking — the situation posed a strategic paradox. On the one hand, a distracted United States mired in Middle Eastern conflicts benefits both Beijing and Moscow; on the other, it comes at the cost of weakening their key regional partner, Iran.
For different reasons, both powers chose to remain on the sidelines — Russia is bogged down by the war in Ukraine, while China, focused on maintaining economic stability amid an intensifying trade war with the US, has little appetite for external entanglements. As a result, neither provided Tehran with concrete military support nor acted to dissuade Washington from targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities.
et, both great powers cannot allow Israel to dominate the Middle East in ways that would entrench a US-led regional order at the expense of their own influence. Post ceasefire, China and Russia are likely to prioritise stabilising Iran and gradually rebuilding its economy and military capabilities, so it can better defend itself in the future. The more pressing question is: will Beijing and Moscow support Tehran’s nuclear quest, if the latter decides to sprint towards a nuclear breakout?
Immediately, however, a prospective ceasefire in Gaza between Hamas and Israel, again brokered by the US, will calm regional tensions across the Middle East. If it materialises, it indicates that the Iran-Israel ceasefire will also hold, providing considerable room for direct US-Iran talks on nuclear and regional issues. Similarly, the Gaza ceasefire will provide a window for a regional initiative to shape the future of governance and security in Gaza, with active support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Any tangible progress on Gaza will build momentum towards Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries joining the Abraham Accords, and in the process, effectively reshape the regional order.
For now, the many ‘unknown unknowns’ surrounding the current geopolitical conundrum in the Middle East make it a volatile flashpoint. But as the belligerents, regional nations, and great powers evaluate the war’s outcomes, the nuclear aspirants around the world are drawing a stark lesson: nuclear weapons remain the ultimate guarantor of state security.
The author is a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney.